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 This monograph examines the role of pseudo operations in several 
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those 
in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along 
with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent 
areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several 
other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very 
successful.
 A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting 
pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and 
operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent 
movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons 
learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued 
usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
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vSUMMARY
 Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla 
defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very 
successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns. 
Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other 
support to these operations.
 These operations, although of considerable value, also have raised a 
number of concerns. Their use in offensive missions and psychological 
operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. In 
general, their main value has been as human intelligence collectors, 
particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying 
guerrilla groups that then are assaulted by conventional forces. Care 
must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too 
far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting becoming involved in 
human rights abuses.
 Just who should control pseudo operations has been somewhat 
contentious, but the teams typically have worked for police services 
or intelligence agencies. This has been largely a result of weaknesses 
in the military intelligence system. Ideally, strengthening military 
intelligence structures to support pseudo operations would be the 
best solution since it would provide better connectivity between the 
pseudo teams and response forces.
 Several factors have marked successful pseudo operations. 
First has been a system of incentives for insurgents to defect to the 
government. These incentives can be positive, usually monetary 
rewards for surrendering; or negative, causing insurgents to cooperate 
to avoid severe punishment. A mix of these forms has proven to be 
very effective, with very few incidents of insurgents redefecting to 
the guerrilla side. In general, the role of guerrilla defectors has been 
critical in successful operations. 
  A critical environmental factor enabling pseudo team success 
is weakness in insurgent command and communications systems. 
Pseudo forces can thrive in environments in which guerrilla forces 
have problems in their communications and in which centralized 
control of the guerrilla groups has been weakened. Pseudo teams, 
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in fact, can help create a synergistic cycle by further weakening 
insurgent command and control, leading to even more opportunities 
for their use. 
 The final critical element of these operations is the effectiveness 
of the response to the intelligence the teams collect, and coordination 
with other government forces. Unless government response forces, 
whether military, police, or intelligence services, are well-trained 
and prepared to take full advantage of the intelligence provided by 
pseudo teams, these operations are unlikely to have their maximum 
impact. Also, unless secure systems are established to avoid 
interference between the pseudo groups and other security forces, 
the teams can be in as much danger from their own side as they are 
from the insurgents.
 Pseudo operation strategies used in earlier counterinsurgency 
campaigns can offer valuable lessons for future missions. It is likely 
that most guerrilla movements have become more sophisticated in 
their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also develop better 
techniques. Still, the pseudo operations strategy should provide 
major benefits against insurgent groups.
1PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
 The term “pseudo operations” (or some variant of it) indicates the 
use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for 
long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas. They 
should be distinguished from the more common police or intelligence 
infiltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case, 
infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the 
other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually 
military or paramilitary.
 The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of 
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In most cases, these operations 
have been very successful. This monograph examines the record of 
several of these cases, discusses some issues raised by these types of 
operations, and suggests key lessons learned.
THE HUK INSURRECTION
 An early example of pseudo-guerrillas was during the Huk 
Insurrection in the Philippines from 1946-55. The principal unit to 
be devoted to pseudo operations was the so-called Force X. The 
group initially was formed in 1948 by members of the Philippine 
Constabulary:
The basic idea was to make this specially trained force into a realistic 
pseudo-Huk unit that could, in enemy guise, infiltrate deep into enemy 
territory. The 47 initial members of Force X were dressed and equipped 
like Huks. They were taught in a remote rain forest base to talk and act 
like Huks by four captured guerrillas who had been “tested, screened, 
and reindoctrinated to our side and brought to the training base to serve 
as instructors.” The principal aim was to enable government forces to get 
close enough to guerrilla forces to eliminate selected targets.1
 One very successful mission of this type is worth describing for 
an indication of how the Force X concept was used:
Accompanied by three military intelligence agents, a group of 20 former 
Huks were infiltrated into [Panay’s] interior. After 3 months of gathering 
2information, establishing their cover as a bona fide Huk unit, and 
gaining the confidence of the island’s Huk leadership, they hosted a “by 
invitation only” barbecue for the Panay High Command. Between the 
ribs and potato salad, the covert government force sprang an ambush 
that killed or captured nearly all the Panay commanders and crippled the 
organization on the island for the duration of the campaign.2
 Beyond the assassination campaign against the Huk cadre, the 
members of Force X also engaged in psychological operations and 
various “dirty tricks” campaigns, to include planting doctored 
ammunition in Huk ammunition caches that would explode when 
fired.3 They also were used for long-term intelligence collection. 
 A similar unit to Force X was established later in the anti-Huk 
campaign. This was called Charlie Company. Due to the Huks’ 
awareness of earlier Force X operations, Charlie Company operations 
normally did not involve actually trying to link with guerrilla groups. 
Instead, they operated small team reconnaissance operations while 
dressed either in uniform or in guerrilla disguises; in some cases, they 
would also conduct “snatch” missions while dressed as guerrillas.4
MALAYA
 During the same period, the British were conducting generally 
similar pseudo operations in their campaign against the Malayan 
Races Liberation Army (MRLA), a predominantly Chinese-based 
insurgent group. This group was called “communist terrorists” (CTs) 
by the British. Originally, the use of pseudo-guerrillas was bottom 
driven, with police Special Branch officers in the districts initiating 
the teams. 
 One of these operations typified the use of pseudo teams. A 
Special Branch officer established links with a MRLA section leader 
by arranging for his wife to deliver her baby in a government hospital. 
After becoming closer to the leader, the Special Branch officer made 
a deal with him. The leader led a column of six insurgents out of the 
jungle into a deliberate ambush in which the leader was carefully 
identified ahead of time and spared. Chinese British soldiers then 
donned the dead insurgents’ uniforms and were led back into the 
jungle by the MRLA member. From there, they operated against 
higher ranking members of the insurgency.5 
3 Robert Thompson, one of the principal civilian architects of the 
counterinsurgency campaign argued that the captured insurgents, 
needed to “belong” to some organization in place of the Communism 
they had renounced; he believed they tended to turn to other ex-CTs for 
guidance in the new world into which they had just emerged . . . . [I]n 
a strange way they could only justify their escape from Communism by 
being personally involved in the struggle against it―which was why time 
after time they begged to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their 
former comrades.6 
 Another author offered a more practical reason for the willingness 
of captured or surrendered insurgents to cooperate: They needed 
“to kill off all the Communists who knew them, and knew of their 
defection or capture, before this news could be spread around 
to the Traitor Killing Squads, which might extract retribution 
from relatives.”7 Whether from practical considerations or more 
complicated psychological factors, surrendered or captured MRLA 
members tended to cooperate with British authorities once under 
their control. 
 In Malaya, one aspect of dealing with surrendered or captured 
guerrillas presented a difficulty that has surfaced in other campaigns. 
Psychological operations campaigns stressed the good treatment of 
surrendered insurgents in an effort to inspire others to surrender 
voluntarily. For other guerrillas to believe this approach, however, 
it was necessary to publicize the current satisfaction of those who 
had already surrendered through photographs and broadcasts.8 This 
approach, of course, conflicted with the requirement to keep hidden 
the identities of those guerrillas who had agreed to cooperate as 
pseudo-guerrillas.
 The British also used pseudo-guerrillas for some psychological 
operations including disguising some troops as MRLA members, 
then launching a false bombing raid on their position. The troops 
were made up to look wounded and then sent into areas where they 
would encounter insurgents and spread tales of the effectiveness of 
British targeting. In general, however, the pseudo teams were used 
for intelligence collection and to target guerrilla camps for bombing 
raids. 
4KENYA AND THE MAU MAU
 From 1952 to 1960, the British fought a counterinsurgency 
campaign against the tribally-based insurgent group called the 
Mau Mau in Kenya. The command and control system for British 
operations in Kenya consisted of provincial headquarters, with 
a provincial emergency committee consisting of police and army 
representatives, and district committees established below them 
with similar members. 
 The group with the principal responsibility for intelligence 
collection was the Special Branch of the police rather than military 
intelligence officers. Due to the increased demands placed on Special 
Branch by the Mau Mau operations, the army seconded sergeants 
from the Kenya Regiment to serve as Field Intelligence Assistants 
(FIAs). These FIAs were posted to “outlying parts” of the districts to 
collect information.9 
 After the FIA system was established, the army headquarters then 
began assigning some army officers at the district level as District 
Military Intelligence Officers (DMIO) to work with the Special Branch 
officers. It was not until later in the counterinsurgency campaign 
that an army officer was assigned to Special Branch headquarters 
to serve as the principal liaison to coordinate the operations of the 
army and Special Branch nationally.10
 Most of the officers and noncommissioned officers had little or no 
formal intelligence training or background. Frank Kitson, who was 
key in developing the concept of pseudo-guerrillas in Kenya, noted 
the attitude of his superiors when he was appointed as a DMIO: “[I]f 
we could not be of any use, could we please not be a nuisance?”11 
 Kitson’s original concept was simply to develop camps in which 
the British “could keep a handful of Africans who could help [the FIA] 
with his interrogations and who could move around the countryside 
planting . . . and visiting informers.”12 In rather short order, however, 
he discovered that captured Mau Mau were willing to work actively 
against their former comrades. Former Mau Mau were used to train 
British African troops and deployed with these troops in the field 
against the insurgents. As with Malaya, the initial deployment of the 
pseudo-guerrillas was bottom driven, with official approval from 
5the British headquarters following only after a number of operations 
had been run. In about a year, the original small pseudo group had 
grown to a force of about 200.13 
 These teams were used primarily to collect long-term information 
and intelligence since, as Kitson notes, “. . . if we always directed 
Security Forces onto gangs immediately after visiting them, the 
terrorists would soon tumble to the idea.”14 It was only when a 
particularly valuable target was encountered that the teams would 
launch direct attacks, unless, of course, a team came under immediate 
threat. Even when the pseudo teams (normally called “pseudo gangs” 
by the British) launched direct operations against insurgent groups, 
they typically tried to capture as many as possible rather than to kill 
them.
 One tool that proved very useful in identifying Mau Mau 
members―a number of whom then were turned to the government’s 
side―was the “hooded man” system:
The Coleman Scheme was to have many more hooded men than Special 
Branch had used. He wanted at least 10 each time and possibly more 
. . . The FIA would then disguise the man before he came into contact 
with the other hooded men, some of whom might be prisoners rather 
than informers. When they were all safely hidden behind their masks, 
they would be assembled and sat down in a row of chairs, with one of 
our men standing behind each one. No hooded man was allowed to talk 
to another . . . When all was ready, the suspects would walk past the 
hooded men. If they recognized anyone they would give brief particulars 
to the FIA standing behind their chair. If a suspect was recognized by 
three or four of the hooded men and if the particulars given to the FIAs 
corresponded, then it was a safe assumption that they had picked the 
right man. In this way, we collected a lot of information about people, 
and we also caught many senior Mau Mau supporters. Quite often we 
would even get active gangsters in the net.15
 Although Kitson admitted that it was a “gross oversimplification,” 
he noted that in terms of recruiting former insurgents to serve with the 
pseudo teams, the Mau Mau could be divided into three categories. 
The first was what might be termed the “true believers,” for whom 
“the only thing to do was to give him away as soon as possible.” 
The second category was those who “had merely joined because all 
their friends had done so, and because life was getting rough in the 
6Reserve.” In general, Kitson found them unsuitable for the teams. 
The final category was “the Africans who joined the gangs from a 
spirit of adventure.” He found the last group to be the best prospects 
for his teams.16
 Training―or “taming” as Kitson calls it―of guerrilla defectors for 
the pseudo teams involved three phases. The first phase involved 
harsh treatment of the prisoner, including chaining him and feeding 
him only the most basic food. In the second stage, “the candidate 
would be incorporated gradually into the community as a friend but 
would not be told much about the business nor would he be left by 
himself.” Finally, “[h]e could sleep with the others, carry arms, do 
sentry duty or go out by himself.” Kitson states that after the system 
became fully implemented, the whole process could occasionally be 
completed in as little as 24 hours.17
 Early operations of the pseudo gangs took place primarily in 
settled areas rather than in the “forest.” As the Mau Mau began 
being forced away from the population, the pseudo team concept 
expanded to longer-term jungle operations, which put much more 
stress on the teams.18 They did have some success in their operations, 
although it does not appear to have resulted in as much impact as in 
their previous operations.
 Although most of the pseudo gangs’ activities involved very small 
scale operations, they had a definite impact on the counterinsurgency 
campaign. Kitson concluded that by 1954 his teams “had probably 
accounted for more actual gang members and weapons than any 
of the large military operations in the past six months.”19 Since the 
guerrillas operated predominantly in small groups, with problems 
in communications between the various groups, the environment 
was ideal for pseudo operations. 
THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
 The French military in Indochina and Algeria would have seemed 
well-placed to use pseudo operations extensively. During the 
French campaign in Indochina, about 325,000 of the 500,000 French 
troops were Indochinese, giving them a natural base for pseudo 
forces.20 Nevertheless, virtually all these native troops were used in 
conventional units. 
7 The French, however, did establish guerrilla groups based 
on native tribal groups. These units, called the Groupement de 
Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (Composite Airborne Commando 
Group or GCMA)―later renamed the Groupement Mixte d’Intervention 
(GMI) or Mixed Intervention Group―were intended to conduct 
guerrilla operations to attack Viet Minh rear areas. The GCMA was 
a subordinate element of the Service de Documentation Extérieure 
et de Contre-Espionnage (French Counterintelligence Service) in 
Indochina. Although relatively effective, the GCMA basically 
was a “conventional” guerrilla force rather than a form of pseudo 
operation.21 
 In Algeria, the French used a large number of native Algerian 
troops called harkis. In total, over 180,000 harkis served in the war, 
a larger number of troops than was fielded by the FLN (National 
Liberation Front, the independence group).22 These soldiers generally 
were used in conventional formations either in all-Algerian units 
commanded by French officers or in mixed units. They also were 
employed as platoon or below sized units attached to French battalions 
in a role akin to the use of Kit Carson Scouts by the United States 
in Vietnam.23 Harki units in this third use were designed primarily 
in an intelligence gathering role, with some reported minor pseudo 
operations in support of their intelligence collection.24 The extent of 
these pseudo operations appears to have been very limited both in 
time and scope, however.
 The most widespread use of pseudo type operations was during 
the “Battle of Algiers” in 1957. The principal French employer of covert 
agents in Algiers was the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare 
branch. In addition to other better known French counterinsurgency 
measures such as a block warden system and widespread use of 
torture to extract information, the Fifth Bureau also made extensive 
use of “turned” FLN members: 
Among the most specialised stratagems within intelligence-led counter 
terrorism was the ploy to reverse the loyalties of captured FLN militants, 
so that after being interrogated they worked for French intelligence . . . 
[Captain Paul-Alain] Leger [of the 10th Paras] ran a network of former 
FLN activists whom he “turned” and sent back into the Algiers Casbah 
after “persuading” them to change sides by torture or by threats against 
their families. These agents were disguised as street sweepers and 
8municipal workers . . . [and] mingled with the FLN cadres. They planted 
incriminating forged documents, spread false rumours of treachery and 
fomented distrust among the [FLN] . . . As a frenzy of throat-cutting and 
disemboweling broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres, 
nationalist slaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did 
France’s work for her.25
 It should be noted that this form of pseudo operation apparently 
involved individual operatives rather than organized units as 
discussed in other cases. Using individuals rather than teams in this 
case may, in fact, have been a more appropriate response since the 
FLN inside Algeria by this point was very fragmented in terms of 
operational control.26 
 As with the case of Indochina, rather than trying large-scale 
pseudo-guerrilla operations, the French focused on developing native 
guerrilla groups that would fight against the FLN. They had some 
success with a group in the Southern Atlas Mountains, providing 
it with arms and supplies.27 Unfortunately for the French, they also 
had a disaster with another group called “Force K.” 
 In this case, the FLN essentially used pseudo-guerrilla strategies 
against the French guerrilla group. Some 1,000 Algerians volunteered 
to serve in Force K as guerrillas for the French. Most of the members 
of Force K either were FLN members already or were turned by the 
FLN once enlisted. Although Force K’s operations initially looked 
promising, complete with the corpses of purported FLN members 
displayed by the unit, these bodies were in actuality those of 
dissidents and members of other Algerian groups killed by the FLN. 
Eventually, upon discovery by the French of the sympathies of the 
majority of “its” guerrillas, the French army tried to hunt down and 
kill its members. Despite French efforts, however, some 600 managed 
to escape and join the FLN with their weapons and equipment.28
RHODESIA AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
 The Rhodesian insurgency developed gradually, initially 
appearing to be more of a law enforcement problem than an organized 
insurgency. It took considerable time for the Rhodesian government 
to acknowledge the severity of the insurgent threat it faced and to 
9develop a coherent response.29 Ultimately, the government faced two 
different major insurgent groups: the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (ZAPU), together with its military arm, the Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA); and the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU), with its military wing, the Zimbabwe National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA). These two groups, largely tribal based, 
used two very different strategies―ZIPRA focused on conventional 
Soviet-style operations, while ZANLA operated under a Maoist rural 
strategy. Neither group cooperated with the other; in fact, there were 
clashes between the two. 
 Intelligence operations in Rhodesia―together with overall 
coordination of counterinsurgency―remained very complicated. 
There were a series of joint operations centers at various levels that 
combined the police and the military; in practical terms, however, the 
army almost always had the major authority. The senior planning level 
was at the Operations Coordination Committee, which combined the 
commanders of the army and air force, the Commissioner of Police, 
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Organization. As one 
study noted, “all decisions had to be reached through an arduous 
system of consensus, with each member retaining the responsibility 
for ensuring that his service carried out agreed-upon command 
decisions.”30 
 By 1977, in an effort to improve centralized planning, the post 
of Commander, Combined Operations (COMOPS) was created. The 
Rhodesian security system, however, never did have a completely 
unified headquarters, and overall planning remained somewhat 
shaky.31 This was particularly true for Special Forces, including 
the Selous Scouts. With the formation of COMOPS, all Special 
Forces units were removed from army control. Instead, they were 
controlled directly by COMOPS Commander Lieutenant General 
Peter Walls. The only role the army headquarters played was to 
provide administrative and logistics support. Also, there was no 
central Special Forces headquarters, and no Special Forces-qualified 
officers were assigned to COMOPS.
 A particular gap in Rhodesia’s counterinsurgency campaign 
was that of intelligence. Virtually all the effective intelligence being 
provided was through the police Special Branch. The military 
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intelligence system was very weak throughout the war. In most cases, 
units below brigade level had only a corporal for their intelligence 
officer. At all levels, the job of intelligence officer was “. . . to be filled 
by someone not suitable for any other post. It was also considered 
the first ready-use pool of officers and other ranks, should a shortage 
of personnel occur elsewhere.”32
 Even after the formation of COMOPS, the intelligence system 
remained very weak:
. . . [L]ack of a central body for coordinating intelligence at COMOPS also 
had a decidedly negative effect on the total intelligence effort. Initially the 
section consisted of a single member . . . This neglect had also led to an 
almost total lack on military intelligence officers capable of control and 
co-ordination of intelligence at top level and to the neglect of military 
intelligence as a serious challenge at lower level.33
 The original impetus for pseudo operations came from 
regional joint operations centers rather than intelligence or police 
headquarters.34 The main driving force was due to the intelligence 
problems already discussed: Field units simply were not receiving 
the intelligence they required to respond to the insurgents. Police 
made an early attempt to use pseudo operations in October 1966, but 
the effort was stillborn.35 The first formal pseudo team was formed in 
January 1973 as an all-African team, with two African policemen and 
four “turned” insurgents. The early teams did succeed in bringing in 
some valuable intelligence, but their overall impact was slight. 
 In November 1973, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) R. H. Reid-
Daly was tasked with forming the Selous Scouts as a pseudo-guerrilla 
force. Its original membership came largely from army trackers, and 
its cover throughout most of its existence was as a tracking unit. The 
original strength of Selous Scouts was about 120, with all officers 
being white and with the highest rank initially available for Africans 
being colour sergeant.36 One major recruiting incentive for African 
volunteers was that their pay was nearly doubled from their normal 
army salaries due to special bonuses.37 Additionally, somewhere 
around 800 turned insurgents eventually were recruited, whose 
salaries were paid by Special Branch.38 Ultimately, the unit reached a 
strength of somewhere around 1,500.
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 The original focus of the Selous Scouts was on intelligence 
gathering for operational forces rather than acting as some form 
of hunter-killer team: “. . . [O]ur pseudo insurgent groups should 
only resort to killing insurgents if they had been compromised, or 
the prize was so extraordinarily great that it was worth the high 
cost of a compromise.”39 Virtually all the intelligence collected by 
the pseudo teams was passed to Special Branch, and the “flow of 
intelligence from the Selous Scouts to local Army commanders was 
very limited.”40
 Beyond the internal intelligence operations of the Selous Scouts, 
they also began conducting an increasing number of external 
operations. These operations involved both intelligence collection 
and direct action missions. Much of the impetus for these external 
operations came from the Selous Scouts themselves, whose leaders 
continued to push more and more for these types of missions. Reid-
Daly argued that: 
External operations, although rarely more dangerous than our internal 
operations, always excited interest and enthusiasm in the troops and 
proved to be a great morale-booster. They also provided a welcome 
break from the general tedium, which often bugged our internal pseudo 
operators.41 
He also notes that the majority of insurgent casualties caused by the 
Selous Scouts, in fact, were created by external operations.42
 A number of the external missions were long-range reconnaissance 
and surveillance missions, but increasingly included offensive 
operations. Selous Scouts originally were involved in an assassination 
attempt against ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo in Zambia. This mission, 
which had to be aborted by the Selous Scouts, later was attempted 
by the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS); the SAS operation was 
a failure. The Scouts conducted regular operations in Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Botswana. 
 In many of these missions, the Selous Scouts would disguise 
themselves and their vehicles as being part of the neighboring 
country’s forces. Other than this, however, some operations 
resembled much more conventional raids than they did covert 
operations. The Rhodesian government normally demanded some 
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element of “plausible deniability” for these operations―principally 
by restricting most direct support air missions―but this political 
fig leaf was very minimal. This became increasingly pronounced 
as the Selous Scouts conducted larger and larger operations, many 
involving large motorized columns launched across Rhodesian 
borders.
 Most of these missions were very successful militarily, but 
their overall political impact was counterproductive. Although the 
Rhodesians generally tried to avoid inflicting significant numbers 
of casualties on the soldiers of the countries they entered, such 
casualties were almost inevitable. Worse, a few operations resulted 
in the deaths of local civilians.43 Even where the Selous Scouts raids 
succeeded in striking guerrilla sanctuaries, the political results could 
be harmful.44
 A good example of this problem was the Selous Scouts’ raid on 
a ZANLA camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August 
1976. Eighty-four Scouts using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars 
painted in Mozambique military camouflage drove directly into 
the camp. Once there, they killed some 1,000 purported guerrillas. 
Militarily, it was a remarkable feat. Unfortunately, the camp was 
formally registered with the United Nations (UN) as a refugee 
camp. Also, even by Reid-Daly’s account, most of those killed 
were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade.45 To 
make matters worse, the camp hospital was set afire by the rounds 
fired by the Scouts, burning alive all the patients. The international 
condemnation of this raid almost certainly outweighed its military 
success in the long term.46
 Captured guerrillas were critical in the intelligence operations of 
the Scouts. The first step in potential recruitment of former guerrillas 
was in the interrogation process: 
For a prisoner to be of any use to us, it was absolutely vital that his 
identity was totally protected and that neither the locals in the area of the 
contact, nor anyone back at the security force base, knew of his capture 
or even of his existence. . . . When a captured insurgent was brought into 
a Selous Scouts fort, the first priority was to give him the best possible 
medical attention available . . . [T]he only things said to him were 
concerned purely with his health and physical welfare. The captive was 
usually astonished to see that everything had been done to ensure his life 
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was saved. And because of this, whether consciously or unconsciously, a 
feeling of gratitude would begin to permeate his mind.47 
From this point, “in nine cases out of ten, the information just poured 
out.”
 At times, of course, the captured guerrilla’s usefulness was 
expended after the interrogation. In virtually all cases, however, 
attempts were made to recruit the prisoners for the Selous Scouts. 
The group had an excellent track record in its recruiting efforts. It 
developed a specific routine for “turning” the guerrillas: 
. . . [T]he best recruiting method was to send another former insurgent 
to visit him in hospital . . . and have a long conversation, dwelling in 
particular upon the hardships the insurgents were experiencing in the 
bush . . . The process of turning insurgents was eased considerably by the 
knowledge that they could be hanged as violators of the Law and Order 
Maintenance Act. He would then be examined thoroughly by members 
of the Selous Scouts to ensure his loyalty―not to the government of 
Rhodesia, but to the members of the unit itself. The insurgent also would 
be offered a cash lump sum for joining the Selous Scouts (together with 
receiving the same salary as a soldier, with the funds being paid by 
Special Branch), and if possible, his family would be moved to the Selous 
Scouts base, where they received free rations, housing, education, and 
medical care.48
 
The Selous Scouts were the most important element in providing 
actionable intelligence for the security forces, however questionable 
the ultimate effects of their external offensive operations. According 
to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 68 percent 
of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the 
Selous Scouts.49 With this record, the Scouts emerged as the most 
potent factor in Rhodesia’s counterinsurgency campaign.
OTHER PSEUDO OPERATIONS
 Kenya and Rhodesia are the two best known examples of the 
use of pseudo-guerrillas, but similar techniques have been used in a 
number of other counterinsurgencies. The Portuguese in particular 
used pseudo operations extensively in their African colonies in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
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 Portuguese pseudo units included the Tropas Especiais (Special 
Troops), Grupos Especiais (Special Groups), and Flechas (Arrows). 
At their maximum strength, some 11,000 personnel served in these 
units, mostly organized in small bands.50 These units, consisting both 
of African troops and “turned” guerrillas, generally were intended 
for intelligence gathering and were controlled by the Portuguese 
intelligence service, the International Police for the Defence of the 
State (PIDE). 
 Guerrilla recruitment was similar to that in Rhodesia, with positive 
reinforcement being stressed. In Mozambique, the Portuguese 
commander “claimed a 90 percent success rate in persuading 
captured guerrillas to turn against their former colleagues . . .”51 In 
Guinea, General Antonio de Spinola reportedly evacuated wounded 
guerrillas to hospitals before his own troops.52
 More recently, the Salvadorans used pseudo teams for intelligence 
collection during their civil war. The Turkish government also has 
used Special Teams (sometimes called Special Action Teams) in 
operations against the Kurdish Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). 
These teams are composed primarily of former army and Jandarma 
(paramilitary) officers and noncommissioned officers. They normally 
dress in civilian clothing or PKK uniforms, or as close as the PKK 
comes to having uniforms. Apparently, the Special Teams do not 
employ former PKK members as part of the teams. Two particular 
issues with the Special Teams emerged during the course of their 
operations. First, they have been accused of “vigilante justice” in 
executing suspected PKK members. Second, team members reportedly 
have been recruited heavily from the right-wing Nationalist Action 
Party.53 
ISSUES RAISED BY PSEUDO-GUERRILLAS
 The governments that have used pseudo operations clearly 
have viewed them as very valuable. At the same time, however, the 
operations that have been conducted have raised a number of problems 
and issues. Not all these issues are amenable to easy solutions, but 
should be considered when planning such operations. 
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Intelligence or Operations?
 The two major models of pseudo operations are as intelligence 
collectors or as operators for direct action missions. In some cases, 
of course, teams have been used for both roles. The main issue for 
governments is to determine in which role pseudo teams are most 
useful?
 The main argument for using pseudo teams as intelligence 
collectors is that by virtue of their training and employment, they 
are ideally situated for collecting human intelligence. Their ability to 
blend with actual guerrillas―at least for reasonable periods of time―
means that they can collect critical intelligence that likely would be 
impossible through normal intelligence means. 
 There are several practical issues involved with using pseudo-
guerrillas exclusively for intelligence collection, however. The first is 
the potential difficulty of extracting these teams before government 
forces act on their intelligence. Second, the longer teams remain in 
an area collecting information, the more chance of being unmasked. 
Finally, there will almost always be a time gap between the time a 
team collects the intelligence and the time other forces can respond, 
potentially giving the guerrillas time to escape.
  One larger point may militate against using pseudo teams for 
routine direct offensive missions. This is the potential political impact 
of such operations. It is all too easy for government opponents to 
brand the teams conducting these missions as “death squads” 
beyond the reach of the law. This certainly has been an issue with the 
Turkish Special Teams. Any mistakes in targeting in which civilians 
or even unarmed members of a guerrilla support structure are killed 
can have severe repercussions for the government. This, of course, 
is even further exacerbated if such operations are cross-border 
operations, leading to the potential for third country nationals being 
killed.
 Given the potential political problems with direct missions, 
intelligence collection appears to be the preferable mission for pseudo 
teams. This, of course, is not completely an either-or proposition. 
The teams in Kenya likely struck the right balance: When operating 
independently, their primary goal was always to take prisoners 
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rather than to inflict casualties. Their attitude was that the potential 
risks involved in taking prisoners rather than killing the insurgents 
immediately were very much worth it in terms of the intelligence 
payoffs.
How Far to Go?
 A key issue involving the use of pseudo insurgents is how far 
they are allowed to go in acting like insurgents. Clearly, unless 
the teams are accepted as authentic in a process that Cilliers calls 
“validification,” they will not be productive (and, of course, can 
be killed). On the other hand, their actions in gaining acceptance 
typically involve questionable activities. 
 At times, in fact, their operations have been counterproductive to 
ultimate government goals. Reid-Daly notes one particular egregious 
case in which a pseudo group conducted a bogus attack on a 
protected village. Their initiative so shamed the real ZANLA groups 
in the area that they started a regular mortaring campaign against 
the village.54 Kitson notes that at times his team members posing as 
guerrilla leaders ordered the beating and fining of Mau Maus; in 
fairness, however, these normally were for offenses involving the 
death penalty under the Mau Mau code.55
 The very presence of pseudo teams can potentially destabilize 
an area. As these teams enter an area, they must sell themselves as 
legitimate guerrillas. Frequently this means conducting propaganda 
operations with the local populace. Even without active propaganda, 
the presence of “guerrillas” may well create doubts among locals 
as to the government’s ability to control its territory and to protect 
them.
 This is an issue for which there are no pat answers. Governments 
should carefully consider the areas in which they insert pseudo 
teams and what types of missions the teams are given. Procedures 
and general rules of engagement should be worked out in advance 
by the headquarters and team commanders. Beyond this, the key 
element will remain the training and judgment of the independent 
teams.
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Who Should Control Pseudo Operations?
 Virtually all the pseudo teams operated to date have been 
controlled by either police services―usually in the form of Special 
Branch or its equivalent―or intelligence agencies. In the cases of 
Kenya and Malaya, this largely was a function of overall British 
counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the primacy of civilian 
control.56 Rhodesia appears to have followed the British model 
largely due to its colonial roots from Britain. Other countries such as 
Portugal, however, also have used a similar structure.
 It is logical to put intelligence agencies or the police equivalent 
of Special Branch in charge of pseudo operations. Both police and 
intelligence services have experience in conducting undercover 
or covert activities. As such, they have gained proficiency in such 
critical issues as maintaining the security of the members involved, 
establishing covert systems of communications, and in general 
“tradecraft.”
 The principal counterargument, that the teams should be run by 
the military, is that most police or intelligence undercover operations 
use individuals rather than formalized teams. Militaries are much 
more accustomed to handling units than are police or intelligence 
services. Also, members of pseudo groups normally will require at 
least basic military tactical skills, for survival, if nothing else. The 
pseudo units who become involved in offensive operations also are 
more likely to need military channels to provide support. 
 Beyond the tactical level, in many cases pseudo teams have grown 
in overall strength beyond the abilities of police services to directly 
supervise them. With the Selous Scouts for an example, their growth 
to about 1,500 strong and a shift to offensive operations would 
have overwhelmed the capabilities of any police service for direct 
supervision.57 Even with the smaller number of teams in Kenya and 
after their successes, there was a significant debate within the British 
administration over whether the pseudo teams should be controlled 
by Intelligence Branch or the Operations Branch.58
 Perhaps the key factor in the historical cases leading to police 
or intelligence control of pseudo operations simply was that the 
military intelligence systems were so weak. If pseudo teams are to 
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be used primarily for intelligence operations, then their supporting 
intelligence system must be capable of rapidly processing the 
information they collect. If the military intelligence structure is not 
prepared for adequate support of the human intelligence the teams 
provide, then some other agency must assume this role.
 The ideal solution would be for militaries engaged in 
counterinsurgency to strengthen their military intelligence system 
to support pseudo operations if required. This would include 
augmenting human intelligence coordination and analysis, training 
in how pseudo operations might be conducted, and establishing 
at least the framework for supporting teams. This likely would be 
particularly important if governments use military units as response 
forces to the intelligence provided by pseudo teams. Using military 
intelligence as the link between the teams and military response forces 
provides more streamlined bureaucratic channels for processing 
immediate intelligence.
What Type of Intelligence Should Pseudo Teams Provide?
 There are several issues surrounding the intelligence provided 
by pseudo teams. The first is how to handle insurgents who have 
been captured as a result of team operations. A particular question 
is that of what should be gained from interrogations since this is 
typically the first stage of recruitment.
 There are two opposing views as to the issues surrounding the 
use of interrogation of captured insurgents. Frank Kitson notes that 
if immediate tactical information is needed, direct interrogation is 
required. This must be accomplished by local commanders, who 
require detailed intelligence for their tactical operations. On the 
other hand, background intelligence for long-term operations is 
best achieved by Special Branch. Acquiring this form of intelligence 
requires a very different approach: “[T]he chief use of a prisoner lies 
in gaining his co-operation and friendship, and a different process, 
which takes much longer, is required.”59
 Reid-Daly, on the other hand, stressed the absolute criticality of 
focusing on immediate tactical intelligence:
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Insurgent prisoners, immediately after capture, provided the best, 
immediate and hottest up-to-the-minute intelligence. But the speed of 
the acquisition of such intelligence was governed by the time it took to 
make the prisoner talk . . . It was important, therefore, that a captive was 
speedily broken, and the intelligence gained from him quickly acted 
upon. If this did not happen, the security forces gained nothing.60 
The same competing approaches can be applied to pseudo operations 
more generally. Pseudo teams can provide a key contribution to the 
current intelligence picture. The problem of acquiring immediate 
intelligence was described well by Reid-Daly: 
It is of little use to a soldier to know where the insurgents were yesterday, 
or even where they might be tomorrow. He needs to know where they 
are now, so that he can do something about it. And this, in effect, was 
the fundamental problem―the acquisition of intelligence, which could be 
immediately acted upon.61
 The opposite approach taken by Kitson is to focus pseudo 
operations on developing long-term intelligence rather than 
immediate tactical intelligence. In this approach, short-term 
intelligence takes a back seat to trying to determine the broader 
pattern of insurgent operations. If done well, this can be critical 
in predicting future guerrilla activities and preempting them. 
Ultimately, this may be of greater benefit in the counterinsurgency 
campaign.
 A second key aspect of using the intelligence collected by pseudo 
teams is how to use this information. The risk of compromise of 
operations can be exacerbated by too obvious immediate use of 
the intelligence provided by a team. If a pseudo team’s intelligence 
reporting of a particular insurgent network results in an immediate 
“roll up” of the network, it likely will be apparent to the other side 
what has happened.62 This is particularly the case, of course, if such 
responses occur repeatedly. 
 This difficulty is a good argument for Kitson’s approach. Certainly, 
some high value targets such as key leaders are worth the risk of 
exposing the pseudo teams’ operations, but in most cases they likely 
are better used for longer-term collection. As with many other aspects 
of pseudo operations, governmental responses to their collection 
activities must be carefully coordinated so that they can continue 
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to operate without being exposed. One technique successfully used 
by many teams was to purportedly move out of an area well before 
government forces arrived, but to maintain covert surveillance of the 
guerrilla forces they had mixed with.
Should Teams be Used to Conduct Psychological Operations?
 In Rhodesia, teams would deliberately violate local customs 
to alienate the people from the guerrillas. They would also target 
members of ZANLA and ZAPRA, pretending to be members of the 
other group. Ultimately, this led to some firefights between the two 
groups. Likewise, the Philippine government used similar tactics.
 Such operations certainly have had some success. Overall, 
however, they likely are not the best use of pseudo teams. Use of 
“dirty tricks” can create significant problems for governments when 
they are discovered. Also, these techniques can create a dangerous 
situation for civilians, either directly or as a result of guerrilla reprisals. 
There also is the problem of determining where to draw the line; as 
these operations develop, the risk of being “overly creative” in new 
tricks to try is very real. 
Are “Outsiders” Essential?
 The insistence of both the British in Kenya and the Rhodesians 
in using white officers led to practical difficulties. Reid-Daly notes 
the problems in “blackening-up.”63 In most cases involving contacts 
with the insurgents, the white officers had to hide outside of the 
village or camp in which their African team members were meeting 
the guerrillas. In at least one case, however, a team used a white 
member as a “prisoner” to gain access to a group of guerrillas.64 
 Likewise, in Kenya, the presence of white members always 
presented security problems. Nevertheless, the mixed race teams 
typically faced only limited difficulties in “selling” themselves as 
Mau Mau despite using relatively primitive disguises.65 In fact, in 
one case in which a team unexpectedly encountered a group of Mau 
Maus, they successfully explained away the white team member 
with them as being an “Asian Mau Mau.”66
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 Clearly, most, if not all, of the insistence on using white leaders 
for the teams in Kenya and Rhodesia was a result of colonial heritage 
and/or racism. In fairness, though, the mixed-race teams seemed to 
bond very closely, and all the members were treated well.67 Also, the 
guerrillas in both countries seemed to see what they expected to see. 
In retrospect, the teams got away with what seems in many cases to 
have been remarkably sloppy tradecraft.
 Nevertheless, despite their successes in melding the teams, there 
seems to be no practical necessity for using such mixed teams. Other 
countries certainly have succeeded in using pseudo teams that could 
blend with the guerrillas. Portugal, in fact, started with white-officered 
units, but rather quickly shifted into all-African teams.68 The issue of 
using “outsiders” is almost certainly even more dangerous, given 
that most insurgent groups likely have become more sophisticated. 
There seems to be little practical advantage to using mixed teams. 
LESSONS LEARNED
 1. Money Counts. In most cases of successful use of pseudo 
operations, money in one form or another has been a key component 
of the campaign. Cash rewards both for civilians to turn in insurgents 
and for insurgents to surrender have provided the basis for the 
respective governments to seize the guerrillas. This, of course, 
is the first step in being able to “turn” them. Rewards for turning 
in guerrillas―usually “dead or alive”―were used in Malaya, the 
Philippines, Kenya, and Rhodesia. 
 In a number of cases, reward money was sufficiently ample 
that guerrilla leaders would turn in their own troops. This became 
common enough in Malaya that some government officials began 
expressing concerns as to the amount of money actually being paid 
out to the insurgent leaders.69 In some cases, both cash rewards and 
relocation were offered to surrendered guerrillas.70 
 Besides cash, in the counterinsurgency campaign against the 
Huks, the provision of land to a number of the insurgents who 
turned reportedly was a very successful tactic. The impact of this 
program was more psychological than practical: “As a resettlement 
program, The Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) did not 
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accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families 
of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee 
you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered. . .”71 The program became 
even more restrictive later, limited to only those Huks who actually 
participated in operations against their former comrades.
 In the larger picture, of course, the use of reward money or other 
inducements as tools for counterinsurgency must be done with some 
discretion. Originally in Kenya, the British administration offered a 
bounty of five pounds for the first small units that killed an insurgent.72 
The result was that few live insurgents were surrendered. Similarly, 
the use of “wanted dead or alive” bounties is not desirable (except 
perhaps for major insurgent leaders) since the odds are good that the 
guerrilla will be brought in dead. First, it must be determined if the 
person was, in fact, a guerrilla and not simply a personal enemy of 
the person seeking a reward. Second, a corpse is of little intelligence 
value.
 Where the bounty system has worked very well is when it has 
been used for getting live guerrillas under government control. 
This particularly has been an advantage for pseudo operations. It 
is a relatively small step for an insurgent who has turned himself 
in to receive a reward and then to agree to actively work for the 
government for even more money.
 2. The alternative to cooperation can be dire. A pattern among 
the successful efforts at pseudo team recruitment of former guerrillas 
is that, although the carrot of financial rewards is valuable, the stick 
of noncooperation can be even more significant. Guerrillas who have 
not agreed to join have faced the prospect of severe punishment, 
including execution. In the case of Kenya, for example, by 1956, 
some 1,000 captured guerrillas had been hanged.73 Similar levels of 
punishment were present in Rhodesia.
 The most interesting factor in this “recruiting tool” is that one 
would expect the guerrillas who joined the pseudo units under such 
threats to be looking for the first opportunity to escape or to betray 
their teams. Rather surprisingly, instead they almost inevitably 
remained loyal and very effective members of their units. Despite 
the large numbers of pseudo missions in Kenya and Rhodesia, there 
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were only a handful of examples of betrayal or desertion. The lesson 
from both these countries was that, given good leadership and tight 
unit cohesion, the ex-guerrillas were every bit as loyal and effective 
as the government troops. 
 3. Coordination is critical. Coordination of the operations 
of pseudo teams with other military operations is critical. Two 
opposing requirements constantly face the planners of pseudo 
operations. If details of ongoing operations are disseminated too 
broadly, the odds of leaks leading to disclosure of team operations 
are increased exponentially. This clearly can result in team members 
being exposed and killed by government opponents. On the other 
hand, if pseudo team operations are held too closely, teams can be in 
danger from the operations of their own side. This, in fact, occurred 
in one operation early in the use of pseudo operations in Rhodesia.74 
In June 1978, another team was killed due to an error in coordination 
between operating boundaries.75
 The principal tool used in deconflicting Selous Scouts operations 
from those of army and police forces was “frozen areas.” The official 
description of how frozen areas would be established read as 
follows:
A Frozen Area is a clearly defined area, in which Security Forces are 
precluded from operating, other than along main roads. Army Security 
Forces already in an area to be declared “Frozen” will be withdrawn 
from such an area by the time stipulated in the signal intimating that 
such an area is to be “Frozen.” This signal must be acknowledged by 
the recipient. The above ruling also applies to all armed members of the 
Services and Government Departments with the exception of:
a. Those personnel tasked to operate exclusively along the Cordon 
Sanitaire.
b. Those personnel stationed at Protective or Consolidated Villages 
and establishments provided with a permanent guard in which 
case they are restricted to 1000 metres from the perimeter of such 
establishments.
c. In the event of a vehicle breakdown, ambush, or mine deterioration 
on the main road within a Frozen Area, those personnel involved are 
to remain in close proximity of their transport.76
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A similar system was used in Kenya in which pseudo operations 
were coordinated with district operations rooms. Areas would be 
cleared, but reportedly “it was not easy.”77 As with Rhodesia, there 
were occasional breakdowns leading to security forces interfering 
with the pseudo teams.78 
 4. Breaking guerrilla communications systems is a key tool. One 
common pattern for success in these pseudo operations has been 
weaknesses in the communications system of the targeted guerrilla 
groups. A key step in preparing the environment in Malaya was 
Special Branch’s breaking of the guerrillas’ primary courier system. 
This forced them to rely on a slower, more cumbersome system that 
was prone to being intercepted by the British.79
 Two aspects of the ZANLA command and control system made 
the operations of the Selous Scouts easier. The first was that the 
insurgents did not have radio communications. As a result, they had 
to rely on couriers, messengers, and written communications. These 
were slow and cumbersome, and enabled the Scouts to break into 
the middle of the system.80 
 The second aspect was that command was very decentralized, 
somewhat unsurprising in many insurgent groups. This 
decentralization made it easier for pseudo teams to convince 
actual guerrillas of their authenticity. It also had a critical impact 
on the teams’ ability to impact the guerrilla groups: “In general, the 
Selous Scouts achieved less success in penetrating the tighter, more 
disciplined ranks of ZIPRA than was the case in the unstructured 
command and control groupings of ZANLA.”81
 5. Effectiveness of pseudo operations depends in large part on 
the effectiveness of response forces. In both the cases of Rhodesia 
and Kenya, the practical impact of the pseudo teams was dependent 
in part on how effectively military units responded to the intelligence 
they provided. Certain units seemed to provide more effective 
military operations against the insurgents. Reid-Daly noted the 
key aspects of the response troops: “There are three prime qualities 
required of a soldier employed in fireforce duties. They are: 1. to be 
highly aggressive; 2. to be an accurate snap shottist; [sic] 3. to have 
plenty of initiative.”82 
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 The Rhodesian military developed a special response force to 
convert the intelligence provided by the Selous Scouts into military 
strikes. The force was called Fireforce, and was equipped with the 
few helicopters that Rhodesia possessed; later it also was augmented 
with paratroopers.83 The best unit for response in Rhodesia reportedly 
was the Rhodesian Light Infantry which worked regularly with the 
Selous Scouts.84 
 Kitson also observed in the case of Kenya that members of the 
Kenya Regiment were particularly good at operations since all their 
men spoke Swahili and understood the area of operations very well.85 
On the other hand, the Kenya Regiment caused some problems for 
Kitson’s teams since it conducted some unilateral pseudo operations 
designed to kill guerrilla groups rather than using them for 
intelligence roles.86
 Connected with the issue of response forces is how to coordinate 
the removal of pseudo teams once the response forces are called in. 
This proved somewhat less of a problem in Kenya since the response 
units typically consisted of elements controlled by police. As such, 
they normally focused on capturing the insurgents. Nevertheless, 
as Kitson noted, when police seized pseudo team members who 
had arranged for the guerrillas’ arrests, they “got their share of the 
bruises.”87
 6. The role of “turned” guerrillas is critical. There are two key 
aspects in the role of captured guerrillas who cooperate with the 
government and their effect on pseudo operations. First, even if 
the guerrillas are not used in the field with the pseudo teams, they 
are critical in providing current information on how the guerrillas 
operate. This can include such aspects as personality profiles of 
guerrilla leaders, current recognition codes and communications 
procedures, and general operating techniques. 
 Without this current intelligence, pseudo operations have no 
chance of long-term success. A corollary of this requirement is that the 
government needs a reasonably steady supply of cooperative captured 
guerrillas. Most guerrilla groups will change their communications 
and codes very regularly as a routine security measure. In many 
cases, these techniques will involve relatively low tech methods such 
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as special visual signals or dead drops. The absolute best source for 
this level of information is a recently captured guerrilla.
 Beyond their intelligence value, cooperative guerrillas can be 
crucial in training pseudo teams. They can provide details of the 
ideological underpinnings of individual guerrillas, details of their 
training and customs, and habits in the field. In short, they can teach 
government pseudo personnel how to think like guerrillas.
 The second key use of cooperating guerrillas is, of course, as 
members of operational teams. In some cases, it appears as though 
government pseudo teams have had some success without using 
former guerrillas, but these cases have been the exception rather than 
the rule. For all the reasons discussed earlier, guerrilla team members 
can be crucial in providing credibility to pseudo teams. If the capture 
and subsequent “turning” of guerrillas is handled surreptitiously, 
then they can be re-inserted into areas in which they have operated 
previously.
CONCLUSIONS
 Pseudo operations have proven to be a valuable tool in several 
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In general, they have been 
best suited for collecting intelligence information that would be 
difficult to acquire through other means. When used for offensive 
operations, the best use for pseudo teams is to capture or kill key 
guerrilla leaders. The teams typically have been controlled by police 
services, but this largely was due to weaknesses in the respective 
military intelligence systems.
 In the best situations, pseudo teams can enter a synergistic cycle in 
which their capture of guerrillas leads to more accurate intelligence 
which in turn results in capturing more guerrillas. Capture should 
always take priority over killing insurgents. Whether the captured 
guerrillas are used primarily for gaining current intelligence or are 
actually part of pseudo teams, their willing and active cooperation is 
essential for the success of pseudo operations.
 Many of the early pseudo operations look in retrospect to be rather 
amateurish in terms of tradecraft. Nevertheless, they worked very 
well. It is likely that most guerrilla movements have become more 
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sophisticated in their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also 
develop better techniques. The pseudo operations strategy, however, 
still should provide major benefits against insurgent groups.
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